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Suppressed v. Suppressed: A Court's Refusal to
Remedy the Legal Profession's "Dirty Little
Secret," Attorney-Client Sexual
Exploitation
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings,
this country has acquired a new consciousness regarding sexual
harassment in the workplace.' Sexual harassment, however, is not
limited to the workplace. These days, sexual exploitation is com-
monly reported in the offices of doctors, social workers, clergy, and
attorneys.2 The most troublesome aspect of these situations is that
the person being sexually exploited is typically in a vulnerable posi-
tion, and is often at the mercy of the person in whom she3 has
placed her trust.
Courts recognize malpractice when the person initiating the sex-
ual contact is a mental health professional.4 Courts, however, have
refused to recognize similar causes of action when the initiator is
an attorney. Recently, in Suppressed v. Suppressed,5 the First Dis-
trict Illinois Appellate Court held that a divorce attorney has no
duty to refrain from sexual relations with a client during the course
1. More generally, 1991 was a year in which "sex" received as much media attention
as the Persian Gulf War, the collapse of communism, and the failing U.S. economy. The
media items that centered on sex included not only the confirmation hearings of Judge
Clarence Thomas, see, e.g., Richard L. Berke, The Thomas Nomination; Thomas Accuser
Tells Hearing of Obscene Talk and Advances; Judge Complains of "Lynching", N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1991, at Al, but also the William Kennedy Smith rape trial, see, e.g.,
Steven Brill, How the Willie Smith Show Changed America, AM. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1992,
at 3, the discovery that Earvin "Magic" Johnson tested positive for HIV, see, e.g., Magic
Johnson with Roy S. Johnson, I'll Deal With It, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 18, 1991, at
16, as well as Pee Wee Herman's arrest in an adult movie theater, see, e.g., Pee- Wee
Herman Arrested on Sex Charge, CHi. TRm., July 28, 1991, at C8.
2. See generally A Special Report.: A Very Private Practice (CBS television news, Chi-
cago, Oct. 28-29, 1991) (reporting instances in which doctors, lawyers, and clergy ex-
ploited vulnerable clients for their own sexual purposes).
3. For consistency, this Note uses feminine pronouns to describe victims. This does
not imply, however, that female professionals never exploit their clients or that male
clients are undeserving of protection. Instead, it reflects the overwhelming majority of
reported cases dealing with sexual exploitation. In fact, some reports describe situations
in which male homosexuals had similar experiences with attorneys. Donna Gill & Nancy
D. Holt, Lawyers Debate Attorney-Client Sex Rule, CHI. LAW., Sept. 1991, at 10.
4. See infra notes 43-71 and accompanying text.
5. 565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 156 (Il.
1991).
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of representation. Although little case law exists regarding attor-
ney liability for sexual relations with a client, there are cases deal-
ing with the liability of psychotherapists in this context. Thus, an
analogous theory of law exists which is applicable to the attorney-
client relationship.
This Note traces the development of the theory which imposes a
fiduciary duty on some professionals to refrain from sexual in-
volvement with their clients.6 It then discusses the Suppressed
case, summarizing the relevant facts and the court's opinion.7 The
Note then analyzes the Suppressed opinion focusing on two points:
(1) whether courts should distinguish psychotherapist malpractice
actions in this area from malpractice actions involving attorneys;
and (2) whether courts may prohibit malpractice claims in which
emotional injury is the only damage alleged by the plaintiff.' Fi-
nally, the Note predicts the impact that the Suppressed decision
will have on practicing attorneys and state bar associations and
proposes how the problem of sexually-exploited clients should be
resolved.9
II. BACKGROUND
Although sexual relationships between attorneys and their cli-
ents during representation have long existed, few lawsuits have
been filed as a result.' ° When sexual relations with an attorney
during legal representation cause harm to a client, typically the
client's legal theory to recover damages is breach of fiduciary
duty.XI In general, a fiduciary relationship arises when two parties
have unequal bargaining power and when one party places confi-
dence in the more influential and knowledgeable party. 12 Indeed,
the attorney-client relationship is "highly fiduciary in its nature
and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requir-
6. See infra notes 10-93 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 94-129 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 130-50 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
10. "About 1% of the 5,000 complaints which the Illinois Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) received during 1989 involved attorney-client sexual
encounters." In re Marriage of Kantar, 581 N.E.2d 6, 12 n.2 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1991) (Greiman, J., concurring) (citing ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS, 54 (1990)). Yet, the ARDC has determined that this "problem is 'a systematic,
unchanging and consistent trend' in the domestic relations field." Id. (Greiman, J., con-
---, ' -.., V-.,--:,, ,-- fLLV _ Nt, (nrn-TT - SA (19QQA .
11. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 197 (1980 & Supp. 1991).
12. In re Estate of Heilman, 345 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1976).
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ing a high degree of fidelity and good faith."13 As a result, all
transactions between attorneys and clients are subject to the closest
scrutiny. 4 Yet, despite the high degree of fiduciary duty imposed
on attorneys, few courts have examined malpractice actions against
lawyers who sexually exploit clients during representation.
A. Sparse Case Law Regarding the Attorney-Client Relationship
Prior to the Suppressed decision, only one court had examined
whether sexual relations between an attorney and client could re-
sult in breach of a fiduciary duty. In Barbara A. v. John G., 5 the
California Court of Appeals considered whether the fiduciary obli-
gation of an attorney encompasses personal relations with a client.
In Barbara A., the attorney represented the client in a post-dissolu-
tion proceeding for modification of spousal and child support.' 6
On two occasions during the course of legal representation, the at-
torney and client engaged in sexual intercourse.17 When the client
expressed fears of getting pregnant, the attorney assured her, "I
can't possibly get anyone pregnant." 8 Relying on this representa-
tion, the client consented to sexual relations and eventually became
pregnant. 19
Addressing the client's claim for legal malpractice, the Barbara
A. court first examined the essence of fiduciary relationships20 and
found that a breach of this type of a fiduciary relationship should
not be limited to purely financial claims.2 The court opined that
courts should also allow actions that allege physical damage result-
ing from a breach of fiduciary duty.22 Second, the court addressed
whether the highest fiduciary standard should be applied to the
attorney in all of his relations with the client, social as well as
legal.23 The court found that this high standard would be applied
if the client could prove the existence of a confidential relation-
13. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 119 (1980 & Supp. 1991).
14. See, e.g, Gaffney v. Harmon, 90 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ill. 1950).
15. 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1983).
16. Id. at 426.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The client was forced to undergo surgery to save her life as a result of a tubal
pregnancy and suffered physical, emotional, and financial injuries. Id.
20. Id. at 432. The court stated that the essence of a fiduciary relationship is "that
the parties do not deal on equal terms," and thus, that the person with superior position
is able "to exert unique influence over the dependent party." Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
1992]
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ship.24 If such a confidential relationship were established, then
the attorney would have the burden of showing that the consent to
intercourse was informed and freely given.25
Since the decision in Suppressed, three courts have discussed the
implications of sexual involvement between attorneys and clients.2 6
These opinions, however, fail to discuss whether sexual relations
between an attorney and client constitute a per se violation of the
lawyer's fiduciary duty.
Less than a year after the Suppressed decision, the First District
Illinois Appellate Court examined a breach of fiduciary duty issue
in a sexual relations context in In re Marriage of Kantar.27 In Kan-
tar, the trial court denied the client's request for a hearing on the
appropriateness of attorney's fees charged her.28 On appeal, the
client argued that her divorce attorney breached a fiduciary duty
by engaging in a sexual relationship with her during representa-
tion. 29 The client further argued that as a result of that breach, the
attorney's fees had been obtained unlawfully through undue
influence.30
Although the majority never reached the breach of duty issue,31
Justice Greiman, in a specially concurring opinion, stated his belief
that the precedential value of the case was sufficient reason to dis-
cuss "the legal profession's 'dirty little secret.' "32 Justice Greiman
stated that the attorney's handling of a case such as this in a "lawy-
erlike fashion" does not constitute a defense.33 Because a sexual
relationship between a divorce lawyer and client creates an inher-
24. Id. The court stated earlier that the existence of a confidential relationship is a
question of fact for the jury or the trial court. Id.
25. Id. The court noted that any other holding "would have a chilling and far-reach-
ing effect on any personal relations" between an attorney and his client. Id. at 432-33.
26. McDaniel v. Gile, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Marriage of Kantar,
581 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991); Edwards v. Edwards, 567 N.Y.S.2d 645
(App. Div. 1991).
27. 581 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991).
28. Id. at 7.
29. Id. The client also alleged that she and her attorney had engaged in sexual rela-
tions at least twenty times during representation and that she was charged legal fees for
all the time during their sexual encounters. Id. at 9.
30. Id. at 7.
31. The majority in Kantar never reached the issue of whether the alleged sexual
relationship breached the attorney's fiduciary duty because it found that the attorney's
fees impropriety alone would be sufficient reason to vacate the trial court's judgment. Id.
at 11.
32. Id. at 12 (Greiman, J.. concurrine). The cotrt did nnt e n .he _ , f ...-.
practice because the case dealt solely with the appropriateness of the attorney's fees
charged. Id. at 14-15 (Greiman, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 15 (Greiman, J., concurring).
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ently exploitative situation, Justice Greiman reasoned that the at-
torney may be unable to serve the client's interests adequately. a4
His reasoning was supported by two commonly recognized rules of
law. First, adultery is grounds for divorce.a If the lawyer is sub-
poenaed to court, his testimony could adversely affect child cus-
tody, or perhaps distribution of property.3 6 Second, the attorney-
client privilege only extends to conversations made in the profes-
sional relationship.37 Any information obtained by the attorney
during personal time could destroy the privilege.38
Similarly, in McDaniel v. Gile,39 the California Court of Appeals
recently considered the issue of attorney liability for sexual rela-
tions with a client and held that seeking sexual favors from an un-
willing client may expose an attorney to tort liability. In
McDaniel, the client claimed legal malpractice against the attorney
who represented her in a marital dissolution proceeding. 40 The cli-
ent contended that the attorney's delay in and withholding of legal
services, as well as his provision of substandard services when she
refused to grant him sexual favors, constituted a breach of his pro-
fessional duty.4' The McDaniel court agreed with the client and
held that such conduct fell below the standard of care and skill
against which members of the legal profession are measured.42
In sum, courts are beginning to recognize that an attorney may
breach the fiduciary duty to a client by engaging in sexual relations
during the course of representation. These courts have been un-
willing, however, to declare that. lawyer-client sexual relations are
a per se violation of the attorney's fiduciary duty.
B. Analogous Malpractice Claims Against Other Professionals
Given the minimal direction provided by the courts in the attor-
ney-client setting, it is helpful to analyze malpractice claims filed
against psychotherapists for engaging in sexual relations with their
patients. Commentators warn, however, that this argument by
34. Id. (Greiman, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 13 (Greiman, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 13-14 (Greiman, J., concurring); see also Edwards v. Edwards, 567
N.Y.S.2d 645, 649 (App. Div. 1991) (noting that when a divorce attorney engages in
sexual relations with his client, he becomes a potential witness to her adultery).
37. Kantar, 581 N.E.2d at 14 (Greiman, J., concurring).
38. Id. (Greiman, J., concurring).
39. 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Ct. App. 1991).
40. Id. at 248- 49.
41. Id. at 249.
42. Id. The court did not address, however, whether sexual relations in the attorney-
client context constitute a per se violation of the fiduciary duty. Id.
1992]
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analogy will be met with resistance by the legal community, which
likely will profess that psychotherapy cases are distinguishable be-
cause they involve the transference phenomenon43 and because
mental health professionals are trained to handle vulnerable pa-
tients." Nevertheless, an inquiry is warranted.
Several states allow malpractice actions against psychologists,45
psychiatrists,46 and social workers,4 7 predicated primarily on the
counsellor's sexual contact with patients. In what is perhaps the
leading case in this area of law, Roy v. Hartogs,4 s the patient was
induced into having sexual intercourse with the defendant-psychia-
trist as part of her prescribed therapy. The court held that by al-
leging emotional and mental injury as a result of the treatment, the
plaintiff asserted a viable cause of action for malpractice. 49 The
Roy court's recognition of malpractice for engaging in sexual rela-
tions with patients provided a foundation for other cases to
follow. 50
After decisions such as Roy, which allowed psychiatric malprac-
tice claims for engaging in sexual relations with patients, plaintiffs
attempted to extend this liability to other professions.5 Courts
were not always willing, however, to allow this extension of liabil-
ity. The Fourth District Illinois Appellate Court refused to do so
in Martino v. Family Service Agency,5 2 when a patient tried to bring
a malpractice action against her social worker after the social
worker fell in love with the patient's husband and engaged in inti-
mate relations with him.
In Martino, the court began its analysis by observing that no
statutory or common law precedent existed for applying the tort of
43. In psychoanalysis, transference occurs when the patient "directs towards the phy-
sician a degree of affectionate feeling... which is based on no real relation between them
and which . . . can only be traced to old wishful phantasies of the patient's which have
become unconscious." SIGMUND FREUD, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1909), in 11
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD
49, 51 (J. Strachey trans., 1957) [hereinafter FREUD'S COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL
WORKS].
44. See Thomas Lyon, Comment, Sexual Exploitation of Divorce Clients: The Law-
yer's Prerogative?, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 159, 191-92 (1987).
45. See, e.g., infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Omer v.
Edgren, 685 P.2d 635 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
47. See, e.g., Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1985); infra notes
56-61 and accompanying text.
48. 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (App. Div. 1976).
A9 Id.
50. See cases discussed infra notes 52-71 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 52-71 and accompanying text.
52. 445 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1982).
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malpractice to social workers.5 3 The court refused to analogize the
situation to the medical profession, where a breach of duty arises
when a psychiatrist engages in sexual relations with a patient dur-
ing therapy.5 4 The crux of the Martino court's refusal to allow this
malpractice action against the social worker was the difficulty in
discerning among the myriad emotional injuries that likely would
be claimed in such actions."
Three years later, however, the Second District Illinois Appel-
late Court examined a set of facts almost identical to those in Mar-
tino, and allowed a malpractice claim against a social worker. 6 In
reaching its decision, the court in Horak v. Biris initially found that
whether a fiduciary duty exists is a question of law to be deter-
mined by the court.5 1 In answering that question, the court rea-
soned that by offering counseling and guidance in marital
relationships, the defendant-social worker placed himself in a posi-
tion of trust.5 8 The Horak court found that a violation of this trust
constituted a breach of the fiduciary relationship. 9 Moreover, the
court presumed that the social worker possessed a basic knowledge
of fundamental psychological principles such that his mishandling
of the transference phenomenon constituted a breach of duty. 60 Fi-
nally, the court noted that various statutory provisions and a code
of ethics made it clear that certain minimum standards of profes-
sional conduct exist for social workers.61
53. Id. at 8.
54. Id. at 9.
55. Id. ("[W]e find no compelling policy reason to... [allow this tort] for unintended
'hurts' most of which we deem likely to be 'slight hurts which are the price of a complex
society.'" (quoting Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157, 164 (Ill. 1961))).
56. Horak v. Binis, 474 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1985).
57. Id. at 17.
58. Id.
59. Id. Specifically, the Horak court stated:
[T]he very nature of the therapist-patient relationship ... gives rise to a clear
duty ... to engage only in activity or conduct which is calculated to improve
the patient's mental or emotional well-being, and to refrain from any activity or
conduct which carries with it a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of mental or
emotional harm to the patient.
Id.
60. Id. at 18. The court noted that the field of practice engaged in by the defendant
more closely resembled the practice of psychology than the practice of social work. Id.
61. Id. at 19. In particular, the court cited the Social Worker's Registration Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 6301 (1979), and a code of ethics adopted by the National
Association of Social Workers. Horak, 474 N.E.2d at 19.
1992]
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C. Emotional Distress Sufficient to Show Injury
in Malpractice Claims
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court in Corgan v. Muehling62
had the opportunity to review a patient's malpractice action
against her psychologist for having sexual relations with her during
treatment. The main issue was whether the plaintiff, who was the
direct victim of the psychologist's negligence, could bring the ac-
tion without alleging any physical symptoms of emotional
distress.63
Following the holding in Horak," the Corgan court first found
that the psychologist owed a duty to the plaintiff.65 The court then
stated that this duty had been breached by the psychologist's mis-
handling of the transference phenomenon.6 Finding both a duty
and a breach of that duty, the court next examined the principal
issue of whether the complaint should be dismissed for failure to
allege a physical injury as a result of the emotional distress.67
Addressing this issue, the Corgan court outlined some of the rea-
sons why other courts impose a physical manifestation require-
ment: emotional distress is difficult to prove, emotional distress
easily could be feigned, and such actions could expose defendants
to potentially unlimited liability.68 However, the court rejected
these rationales for requiring a physical injury primarily on the ba-
sis of advanced modem scientific research.69 The court also reaf-
firmed its faith in the ability of jurors to sift out fraudulent claims
from meritorious ones.7" Consequently, the court found that the
plaintiff had alleged a viable action for negligent infliction of emo-
62. 574 N.E.2d 602 (Il1. 1991).
63. Id. at 607. The Corgan court stated that the specific allegations that a direct
victim who has suffered emotional distress as a result of a psychotherapist's negligence
must make, have yet to be determined. Id. The court noted that the question of whether
a physical manifestation is required when there is emotional injury has "deeply divided
the courts of our sister States." Id.
64. Horak v. Binis, 474 N.E.2d 13 (Il1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1985); see supra notes 56-61
and accompanying text.
65. Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 606-07.
66. Id. at 607.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 608.
69. Id. The court explained that there are two responses to traumatic stimuli: pri-
mary and secondary. Id. While a primary response is "an immediate, automatic and
instinctive response," secondary responses are "longer lasting reactions that are caused
by a person's inability to cope adequately with a traumatic event." Id. When both re-
For a greater analysis of these scientific developments, see Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d
758, 766-67 (Haw. 1974).
70. Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 609.
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tional distress, even though she had not alleged physical symptoms
of the distress.7' Thus, the Corgan decision evidences the Illinois
courts' acceptance of emotional distress claims without requiring
physical manifestation of the injury.
In sum, although courts initially were reluctant to allow claims
against various professionals for breaching their duty to refrain
from sexual relations with patients or clients, increasingly, the
courts have expanded this duty to impose liability when clients are
vulnerable to, and suffer injury from, sexual involvement. More-
over, in Corgan, the Illinois Supreme Court established that emo-
tional distress alone is sufficient to show injury in a malpractice
claim.
D. Alternative Methods of Redress for Sexual
Exploitation by Attorneys7 2
If a sexually-exploited client decides not to sue the attorney
under tort law, the client may seek disciplinary action against the
attorney by reporting the attorney's actions to the state bar.73 Af-
ter the client files a report, the state bar inquires into the attorney's
conduct to determine if the attorney should be exonerated or if the
results of the investigation should be submitted to the court for
judicial determination. 74 Typically, the court has the power to dis-
bar, suspend, or reprimand the attorney.75
71. Id. The court noted that its reasoning was consistent with Illinois law for the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress:
"The stronger emotions when sufficiently aroused do produce symptoms that
are visible to the professional eye and we can expect much more help from the
men of science in the future. In addition, jurors from their own experience will
be able to determine whether . . . conduct results in severe emotional
disturbance."
Id. (quoting Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157 (Ill. 1961) (citation omitted)).
72. Although malpractice suits against attorneys are the primary focus of this Note,
this section is provided to explore other avenues of redress for sexually-exploited clients.
73. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 87 (1980 & Supp. 1991). In Illinois, the
aggrieved party can report the alleged misconduct to the court-appointed Administrator.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10A, para. 751(a) (1989).
74. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 88 (1980 & Supp. 1991). On its own initiative
or at the instruction of the Administrator, the Illinois Inquiry Board investigates com-
plaints and determines whether to dismiss the charge, close investigations, or file a fur-
ther complaint with the Hearing Board. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 753(a)(2)(3)
(1989 & Supp. 1990).
75. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 31 (1980 & Supp. 1991). If a complaint is filed
with the Illinois Hearing Board, hearings panels will conduct hearings on the complaint
and make findings of fact and law. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 753(c)(3) (1989 &
Supp. 1990). The Hearing Board will then administer a reprimand or recommend disci-
plinary action by the court. Id.
1992]
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Among the more frequently cited reports is In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Gibson.76 In Gibson, the attorney appealed
from the referee's findings that he engaged in unprofessional con-
duct by making sexual advances toward his client.77 The client,
who was having marital difficulties at the time, was meeting with
the attorney in his office when suddenly he asked her to take her
clothes off.78 After the client refused, the attorney went to bring
her some tea.79 The attorney then turned off the lights, knelt be-
side her, "began kissing her, put his hands inside her blouse and
fondled her breasts, and moved his hands over her pelvic area
outside of her clothing."' The attorney stopped only after the cli-
ent told him that she was frightened."' The client reported the in-
cident to the judge before whom she had a hearing the next
morning.82
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the attorney had vio-
lated a common law ethical rule against unsolicited sexual contact
and upheld his ninety-day suspension. 3 The court found it rele-
vant that a client usually looks upon the attorney as one who will
protect the client's best interests such that the client often "is par-
ticularly vulnerable to improper advances made by the attorney. '8 4
Further, the court observed that fear of losing the attorney's repre-
sentation will render the client reluctant to end the relations.8 "
Similarly, in Committee on Professional Ethics v. Durham,6 the
Iowa Supreme Court examined whether professional ethics were
violated when an attorney engaged in several instances of kissing
and fondling her client who was an inmate in the Iowa State Peni-
tentiary. 7 Because the attorney signed her name in the visitor's
log as the inmate's attorney, the court stated that her responsibility
76. 369 N.W.2d 695 (Wis.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 976 (1985).
77. Id at 696. The referee recommended that the attorney's license to practice law in
Wisconsin be suspended for 90 days. Id
78. Id. at 697. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare for a hearing the next day
to obtain a temporary restraining order to remove the client's violent husband from their
home. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. Specifically, she told him that she was visualizing being beaten. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 699-700 (citing State v. Heilprin, 207 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. 1973)).
84. Id. at 699.
0 . 1Jt.
86. 279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979).
87. Id at 281. The attorney appealed from the Grievance Commission's recommen-
dation that she be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year. Id.
[Vol. 23
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at the prison was to function in a professional capacity.8, Since the
attorney's actions in the prison were not "temperate and digni-
fied," the court held that the attorney violated the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. 9 Even though the court found an ethical
violation, it nevertheless ruled that the attorney's professional com-
petence was not adversely affected nor was the conduct severe
enough to warrant a suspension for any length of time. °
Thus, Gibson and Durham both illustrate that courts will not
hesitate to find violations of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct when an attorney engages in sexual relations with a client dur-
ing representation. When determining the proper sentence to
impose for such ethical violations, the court often will consider the
injury caused by the attorney's conduct. Specifically, the Gibson
court focused on the harm suffered by the client and suspended the
attorney from practicing law for ninety days, whereas the Durham
court looked to the damage done to the legal profession and merely
admonished the attorney.91
88. Id. at 285.
89. Id. (citing IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY OF LAWYERS EC
1-5, 9-6 (1978)).
90. Id. at 286. The court merely reprimanded and admonished the attorney for her
conduct. Id.
9 1. For other cases disciplining attorneys for sexual advances toward their clients, see
In re Adams, 428 N.E.2d 786 (Ind. 1981); Drucker's Case, 577 A.2d 1198 (N.H. 1990);
In re Stanton, 708 P.2d 325 (N.M. 1985); Cincinnati Bar Association v. Fettner, 455
N.E.2d 1288 (Ohio 1983); State v. Heilprin, 207 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. 1973).
Besides malpractice and disciplinary actions, a third and more novel approach to com-
batting the problem of a sexually-exploitative attorney recently was attempted. In Doe v.
Roe, 756 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1991), the client brought a Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a), (c) (1988), claim against the
law firm and its divorce attorney who allegedly misused his position to coerce and intimi-
date the client into having sexual relations with him. Interestingly, the defendant-attor-
ney in Doe is the same attorney sued in the Suppressed case. Doe, 756 F. Supp. at 360
n.13; Michael B. Reuben, Arnie Becker's Evil Twin?, LITIG., Summer 1991, at 51, 52.
In Doe, the attorney agreed to represent the client in a divorce proceeding in 1983.
Doe, 756 F. Supp. at 354. On the client's second visit to the attorney's office, the attorney
made sexual advances. Id. Primarily because of her psychological dependence on the
attorney, the client feared that the attorney would not represent her if she refused his
advances. Id. Consequently, the client submitted to the attorney's sexual demands. Id.
These relations continued from 1983 to 1988, and at one point during a sexual episode,
the client's husband discovered them in her bedroom. Id. at 354-55.
In 1986, after the client had fallen behind in her payments for the legal services, she
allegedly received a letter from the attorney which threatened that the firm had some
"'very Italian friends who could be eye witnesses to some slight injury on [her] part' " if
she didn't pay the $6,500 bill. Id. at 335. The letter also warned, "'I don't want to read
your name in the paper, and I don't mean on the funny pages!' " Id. Finally, the letter
allegedly informed the client that if she did not pay the balance in full, the attorney would
work it out with her " 'in other ways'" to pay the balance. Id.
In 1989, after the client's present attorney wrote a letter to the defendant informing
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In summary, courts presently recognize malpractice suits against
psychotherapists for engaging in sexual activity with patients dur-
ing therapy.92 Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court recently
stated that emotional distress is sufficient to show injury in a psy-
chological malpractice claim.93 When attorney-client sexual rela-
tions are involved, courts now realize that an attorney may be
breaching a fiduciary duty to the client. To date, courts have not
yet accepted any per se breach of duty when an attorney engages in
sexual relations with a client during representation. As an alterna-
tive to seeking monetary damages, a client may seek to have an
attorney disciplined by reporting the attorney's actions to the state
bar.
Therefore, given the paucity of cases on attorney liability, it is
understandable that courts continue to struggle with the proper
resolution of this issue. Nevertheless, the court's decision in Sup-
pressed illustrates that courts should be less reticent in finding an
actionable malpractice claim when an attorney engages in sexual
relations with a client during the course of representation.
III. DiscussiON
A. Factual Background
In Suppressed v. Suppressed,94 a forty-year-old woman and
mother of three hired an attorney to represent her in a divorce
action. In her first meeting with the attorney on November 4,
him that the client would be seeking redress for her injuries, the defendant allegedly
phoned the client directly and threatened to " 'rip [her] to shreds'" and make her look
like a " 'slut.' " Id. at 356. The client allegedly continued to receive threatening phone
calls from anonymous persons and frequent early morning phone calls in which the caller
said nothing. Id. The client further alleged that the attorney implemented similar
schemes of fraudulent activity on at least three other female divorce clients. Id. at 357.
The Doe court held that the client failed to state a RICO claim because there was no
injury to business or property and that physical injury and mental suffering do not consti-
tute RICO injury. Id. at 358. In rejecting numerous arguments by the client that she did
in fact incur injury to property, the court stated that the client's "actual injury was the
personal injury of sexual servitude, not a loss of property." Id. at 359. Because the
RICO claim was dismissed, the client's pendent state law claims for breach of fiduciary
duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress were also dismissed without prejudice
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 360.
92. See, e.g., Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1985); Roy v.
Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div. 1976).
93. Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 609 (Ill. 1991).
94. 565 N.E.2d 101, 102 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 156
(I11. 1991). The Suppressed case genernted mnieh dic¢,,."
magazines. See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 91, at 51; Rob Warden, Secret Suits, CHI. LAW.,
Apr. 18, 1989, at 1; Mary Wisniewski, Sex With Clients an Unfair Affair, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Apr. 20, 1991, at 1.
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1983, the plaintiff paid him $2,500 in exchange for his agreement
to represent her.9" At the attorney's request, the plaintiff met with
him on December 10, 1983, at his office. 96 At this time, the attor-
ney locked the door, unzipped his pants, and requested that the
plaintiff have oral sex with him.97 "Stunned and confused," the
plaintiff complied with his request for fear that he would not repre-
sent her if she objected.98
Despite her aversion to his behavior, the plaintiff agreed to meet
the attorney again in his office on December 14, 1983.99 After tell-
ing her that "they would be going someplace," the attorney left the
office with the plaintiff and took a taxi to a nearby apartment build-
ing." Inside an apartment, the attorney "insisted that [the plain-
tiff] inhale a liquid solution" from a brown bottle which made her
light-headed.10 ' Plaintiff then submitted to sexual intercourse with
the attorney for fear that her refusal would jeopardize her divorce
proceeding.'02 The same events again occurred on January 11,
1984.103
Due to the plaintiff's "growing belief" that her sexual exploita-
tion was not necessary to her divorce proceeding, she discharged
defendant as her attorney in February, 1984. '" Plaintiff then hired
a new attorney and her marriage was dissolved to her satisfaction
on May 30, 1984.105
On December 8, 1988, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the
attorney and his law firm alleging breach of fiduciary duty.' I The
plaintiff claimed that the attorney had psychologically coerced or
seduced her into engaging in sexual relations with him during legal
representation. 1 7 The trial court dismissed the complaint based
95. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d at 103. The plaintiff contacted this particular law firm
because of its purported expertise in the area of domestic relations law. Id. at 102.
96. Id. at 103.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. In submitting to the attorney's sexual desires, plaintiff contemplated the in-
terest of her children as well as the divorce proceeding. Id.
103. Id. Plaintiff again inhaled a substance and complied with the attorney's request
to have sexual intercourse. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. In July 1987, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant with the Illinois
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. Id. The Inquiry Board closed the
investigation without taking any action. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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upon its conclusion that the applicable two-year statute of limita-
tions for personal injury actions had expired. 108
On appeal, the plaintiff contended "that her complaint stated a
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, which is a breach of
the unwritten contract for legal services, thereby invoking the five-
year statute of limitations."" The appellate court affirmed the de-
cision of the trial court, holding that the plaintiff's complaint failed
to state a cause of action because the duty of care allegedly
breached by the attorney does not exist, and because no actual
damages were alleged. 10
B. The Illinois Appellate Court Opinion
The court recognized that although this wrong has existed
"since biblical times," only one documented case has discussed sex-
ual relations in the attorney-client context."' The court observed
that the issue essentially was whether a cause of action existed for
legal malpractice in this context." 2
The court established that in a legal malpractice action, the
plaintiff must allege: "(1) that the attorney owed the plaintiff a
duty of care arising from an attorney-client relationship; (2) that
the attorney breached that duty; and (3) that as a proximate result,
the plaintiff suffered actual damages."'" 3 In Suppressed, the court
observed two flaws in the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim. First,
the court found that the attorney owed no duty to the client to
refrain from sexual relations, because an attorney's duty is limited
to providing competent legal services." 4 Second, the court found
that the client suffered no injury as a result of the attorney's actions
because her marriage was eventually dissolved to her
satisfaction. 11-5
1. The Duty of Care
The Suppressed court feared "creating a new species of legal
malpractice" if it recognized a duty in the attorney-client relation-
108. Id.; see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-202 (1989).
109. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d at 103; see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-205
(1989).
110. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d at 104.
111. Id. (citing Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1983)); see supra
notes 15-25 and accompanying text (discussing the Barbara A. case).
112. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d at 104.
11. I. a.
114. Id. at 105.
115. Id. at 105-06.
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ship. 1 16 The court believed that creation of such a duty would
mandate that attorneys "refrain from intimate personal relation-
ships" with all clients. 1 7
In addition, the court noted that although the fiduciary relation-
ship that exists in an attorney-client setting requires "the utmost of
good faith and fair dealing," the duty is limited to providing com-
petent legal representation."' The court then distinguished the fi-
duciary duty owed by an attorney from that owed by a
psychologist.' 19 First, in malpractice actions against psychothera-
pists, courts recognize the phenomenon known as "'transference,'
whereby the patient transfers feelings to the therapist."'2 0 Second,
because therapists are trained in those matters, the courts are more
willing to treat the mishandling of transference as malpractice.1 2'
Finally, the court recognized that a higher standard of care
would exist if the attorney made his legal representation contingent
upon sexual favors or if his legal representation of the client was
adversely affected by the sexual relations. 2 2 Although the plaintiff
in Suppressed possibly felt that she had no other option but to sub-
mit to sexual relations, the court found that her statement was "too
tenuous and [fell] short" of alleging facts sufficient to state a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty. 23
2. Actual Damages
The third prong of the malpractice inquiry focuses on whether
the plaintiff suffered actual damages as a result of the breach of
duty. 24 The court in Suppressed focused on whether the client's
legal position somehow suffered as a result of the alleged breach. 25
Because the plaintiff's marriage was eventually dissolved and her
divorce agreement was satisfactory to her, the court found that her
legal position had not been harmed. 2 6
116. Id. at 104.
117. Id. Further, the court stated that it is for the state bar to decide whether an
actionable breach of ethics exists when an attorney induces a client into sexual relations.
Id. at 105.
118. Id. at 105.
119. Id.; see supra notes 43-71 and accompanying text.
120. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d at 105 n.2.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 105.
123. Id. The court agreed that the defendant's behavior may have been unethical,
but did not think that it was sufficient to constitute legal malpractice. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying note 113.
125. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d at 106.
126. Id. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that she suffered the expense of
hiring a new attorney after she discharged the defendant. Id.
1992]
Loyola University Law Journal
Moreover, in examining the plaintiff's claim that she suffered
emotional harm from the sexual relations, the court surmised that
allowing an unquantifiable injury such as this would open the door
to malpractice actions whenever clients are unhappy with their
legal representation.127 Creating such a new cause of action could
have a "serious chilling effect" on attorney-client relationships and
allow the potential for blackmail.1 28 In conclusion, the court sug-
gested that the legislature should create a cause of action for sexual
exploitation cases such as this, similar to the one recently approved
for psychotherapists. 12
9
IV. ANALYSIS
In light of the reasoning of prior decisions in Illinois, the court
in Suppressed should have allowed the malpractice claim against
the attorney for breach of duty. First, the court failed to realize
that transference occurs in many professional relationships, and
most certainly in the context of a divorce attorney-client relation-
ship. Second, emotional harms are just as real and painful as inju-
ries that are evidenced by a physical manifestation. Thus, the lack
of a physical manifestation should not be a basis to reject an other-
wise viable claim.
Transference is a phenomenon through which a client transfers
to a professional "the emotions which the client has about an im-
portant figure in his early childhood."' a Transference tradition-
ally arises in any relationship in which trust is involved.'" In fact,
several authors have observed that transference occurs in divorce
attorney-client relationships. 32
127. Id.
128. Id. at 106 n.3. The court opined that the plaintiff may have been able to allege
an allowable claim for battery or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id at 106.
129. Id. at 106 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 802 (1989) (imposing malprac-
tice liability for psychotherapists)).
130. James R. Elkins, A Counseling Modelfor Lawyering in Divorce Cases, 53 NOTRE
DAME LAW. REV. 229, 253 (1977). In fact, Elkins notes that the emotions in a divorce
attorney-client relationship are similar to those in a parent-child relationship. Id. at 253
n. 120.
131. SIGMUND FREUD, The Dynamics of Transference (1912), in 12 FREUD'S COM-
PLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS, supra note 43, at 106.
132. See ALAN A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 199 (1984); ROBERT
S. WEISS, MARITAL SEPARATION 259 (1975). For a discussion of how this phenomenon
occurs, see ANDREW WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 17 (1968). Watson explains:
[W]hen a client seeks help from a lawyer, he is generally ignorant of the techni-
cal aspects of law. His ordinary techniques for judging persons or situations
must be suspended, for he has no way of adequately testing the competency of
the lawyer he chooses. He may make inquiries about him, and he may be able
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One reason transference occurs in attorney-client relations in di-
vorce suits is because of the psychological impact that marriage
dissolution has on individuals. Some studies show that as many as
forty percent of divorced individuals could be diagnosed as psychi-
atrically impaired.1a Many of these people should be seeking med-
ical help; instead, they rely solely on attorneys because of the
stigma attached to seeing a psychiatrist. 1 34 These individuals are
often in a weak mental state and place full confidence in divorce
attorneys, making them easy prey for sexual exploitation. 135
The Suppressed court explained that psychotherapists are
trained to treat the transference phenomenon. 3 6 Thus, their mis-
handling of the transference provides the basis for a malpractice
claim. Such relationships are distinguishable, the Suppressed court
reasoned, from attorney-client relations because the attorney is not
trained to treat transference. 3 7 This logic, however, may be short-
sighted. Authors frequently have noted that clients who seek di-
vorce representation are vulnerable to sexual advancement.3M An
attorney may not know how to handle a psychologically im-
balanced client, but he should recognize the dangers that exist if he
engages in sexual relations with her. Following the reasoning in
Horak, 39 a divorce attorney should be presumed to possess a basic
knowledge of fundamental psychological principles such that the
mishandling of the transference phenomenon constitutes a breach
of duty. 'I As one commentator noted, the mishandling of trans-
ference by a psychotherapist is in reality just a more technical way
to investigate past successes and failures; but, generally, he is unable to make
any realistic appraisal of skill and trustworthiness. Of necessity, then, he must
place himself under the authority and assistance of the lawyer, essentially in
blind trust. By virtue of this fact, all the client's previous attitudes about au-
thority and dependency will be stirred up. This will elicit, usually, a certain
amount of irrational fear and concern, which the client will be helpless to deal
with. He will feel impotent to broach these fears, and will conceive of the rela-
tionship to his attorney as one of helplessness although, in reality, he is free to
procure a new lawyer any time he wishes.
Id.
133. Bernard L. Bloom et al., Marital Disruption as a Stressful Life Event, in DI-
VORCE AND SEPARATION: CONTEXT, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 187 (George Lev-
inger & Oliver C. Moles eds., 1979).
134. Lyon, Comment, supra note 44, at 172.
135. See WEISS, supra note 132, at 57 (explaining that marital separation causes lone-
liness which drives some individuals to "enter affairs, appropriate or inappropriate, to
gain some respite from loneliness").
136. Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 105 n.2 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
137. Id. at 105.
138. See, e.g., WEISS, supra note 132.
139. Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1985).
140. Id. at 18; see supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
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of describing an abuse of a fiduciary relationship.' 4
Furthermore, although the client's legal position in Suppressed
was not affected adversely, the court failed to consider possibilities
when a client's legal situation may be harmed by sexual relations
with an attorney. As Justice Greiman stated in Kantar, the han-
dling of a case in a "lawyerlike fashion" should be no defense to a
breach of duty claim. 142 If the sexual activity with the attorney is
discovered, it can adversely affect child custody or distribution of
property."' Personal discussions with an attorney also may de-
stroy the attorney-client privilege.144
The Suppressed court also expressed concern that allowing the
plaintiff's claim would send a signal to the legal community that in
all attorney-client contracts, there is a duty to refrain from inti-
mate personal relationships. 4  However, such a broad proscrip-
tion is unnecessary. The court could have limited its holding to
client relationships with divorce attorneys or other relationships in
which compelling considerations-"the client's vulnerability, the
attorney's superior power, or the resulting transference"'---are
present. Such situations may include working with criminal de-
fendants, clients who are poor or uneducated, or clients seeking
representation in probate matters. The following are relationships
in which this principle may not apply: a patent lawyer and an in-
ventor, a real estate lawyer and a developer, a personal injury law-
yer and an injured plaintiff, or a corporate lawyer and a CEO.' 47
These relationships present situations in which the parties would
likely be in positions of equal bargaining power.
The second reason given by the court in Suppressed to reject the
plaintiff's claim was that the emotional harm she suffered as a re-
sult of her relationship with the defendant attorney was insufficient
to state actual damages in a malpractice action.' 4 The state of the
law in this area at the time of Suppressed may have been unclear. 149
141. Lyon, Comment, supra note 44, at 193.
142. In re Marriage of Kantar, 581 N.E.2d 6, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991)
(Greiman, J., dissenting); see supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
143. Kantar, 581 N.E.2d at 14 (Greiman, J., concurring). The attorney could be
subpoenaed to testify regarding the client's adultery. Id. at 13 (Greiman, J., concurring).
144. See People v. Adam, 280 N.E.2d 205 (Ill. 1972). See generally GRAHAM C.
LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 90, at 332 (1978) (explaining
that oral communications between the client and the attorney must be made for the pur-
pose of obtaining or rendering legal services to come within the attorney-client privilege).
145. Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
146. Lyon, Comment, supra note 44, at 199.
147. See Kantar, 581 N.E.2d at 15 n.9 (Greiman, J., concurng).
148. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d at 106.
149. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
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However, the Illinois Supreme Court recently pronounced that the
advancement of modem research, as well as the ability of jurors,
should allow judicial bodies to sift out fraudulent emotional injury
claims from truthful ones. 50 As a result, the courts' fears of frivo-
lous claims are no longer proper bases for rejecting malpractice
actions.
V. IMPACT
The immediate effect of the court's decision in Suppressed is to
send a clear signal to practicing attorneys that they may use their
superior position of power in the attorney-client relationship to in-
duce or coerce vulnerable clients into engaging in sexual activity.
In deciding that this problem should be resolved by the state bar,
the Suppressed court sidestepped a sensitive issue that has been ig-
nored for a long time. 51
The Suppressed decision stirred enough emotion in Illinois legal
circles that the Illinois Senate took notice. In July 1991, the Illi-
nois Senate passed a resolution that "urges" the Illinois Supreme
Court to adopt a rule prohibiting sexual contact between attorneys
and clients. 5 2 The prohibition would apply in all situations unless
the client is the spouse of the attorney, the sexual relationship be-
gan before the lawyer-client representation, or any other situation
that, in the court's discretion, would not detract from the attor-
ney's representation.' 53 To date, the Illinois Supreme Court has
not acted on the resolution. 54
Moreover, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers re-
150. Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 608-09 (111. 1991); see supra notes 62-71
and accompanying text.
151. See State Bar Struggles with Ethics of Lawyer-Client Sex, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug.
4, 1986, at A4. As one of the drafters of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity has admitted, lawyer-client sexual relations have "been recognized within the Bar and
talked about in kind of a hushed way for 25 years." Id.
152. David Heckelman, Senate Urges Court to Ban Sex Between Lawyers and Clients,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 5, 1991, at 1. Interestingly, the idea for the original bill came
from the plaintiff in Suppressed. Wisniewski, supra note 94, at 1. This woman also testi-
fied before an Illinois Senate Committee in May of 1991. William Grady, Lawyers Seek-
ing New Image, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 1991, at Cl.
153. Heckelman, supra note 152, at 1.
154. The California Bar Association adopted, in 1990, what is believed to be the first
rule in the United States restricting sex between lawyers and their clients. See Philip
Hager, Lawyer-Client Sex Ethics Rule Blocked by Court, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1991, at
A3. In late August 1991, the California Supreme Court directed the State Bar Board of
Governors to obtain additional comment for 90 days on the lawyer-client sex rule. Id.
The Oregon State Bar Association also recently considered a recommendation that would
ban sex between lawyers and their clients. Tracey Tyler, No Sex Please: Lawyer and
Client Affairs Frowned Upon, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 4, 1991, at B1.
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cently adopted a code of conduct to offer guidance to all divorce
lawyers in the United States.' 55 The code, called the "Bounds of
Advocacy," includes a strong statement against divorce attorneys
having sexual relations with clients.'56 However, compliance with
the code is purely voluntary and cannot be the subject of discipli-
nary actions against an attorney. 57
Changes are underway in the legal community as public aware-
ness of lawyer-client sexual exploitation increases. Because of the
likelihood that more state bar associations eventually will adopt
similar rules of conduct prohibiting attorney-client sexual rela-
tions,158 it is probable that the courts will follow suit. In the future,
courts likely will allow clients to recover monetary damages for
malpractice when an attorney induces or coerces them into sexual
relations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Today, sexual exploitation by professionals of their clients is not
an uncommon occurrence. The victims in these cases are fre-
quently vulnerable people, in desperate need of assistance, who
have placed their trust in the professional. A fiduciary relationship
in which one party has a superior position of power is evident in
these professional relationships. By not imposing a duty on attor-
neys to refrain from sexual involvement with their clients, the
court in Suppressed misunderstood basic psychological principles
and failed to take the initiative to remedy this vexing problem in
today's society. Nevertheless, state bar associations are beginning
to take note of this problem. Consequently, it is likely that courts
soon will follow the lead of state bar associations and allow mal-
practice claims when injury results from attorney-client sexual
relations.
ROBERT H. MURIEL
155. Grady, supra note 152, at Cl.
156. Id
117 Id
158. Not all attorneys agree that an ethics rule banning lawyer-client sexual relations
will solve the problem of client vulnerability. For a thorough discussion of the strong and
diverse views regarding the adoption of such a rule, see Gill & Holt, supra note 3, at 1.
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